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Decarbonisation of existing infrastructure systems requires a dynamic roll-out of technology at an
unprecedented scale. The potential disruption in supply of critical materials could endanger such a tran-
sition to low-carbon infrastructure and, by extension, compromise energy security more broadly because
low carbon technologies are reliant on these materials in a way that fossil-fuelled energy infrastructure is
not. Criticality is currently deﬁned as the combination of the potential for supply disruption and the
exposure of a system of interest to that disruption. We build on this deﬁnition and develop a dynamic
approach to quantifying criticality, which monitors the change in criticality during the transition towards
a low-carbon infrastructure goal. This allows us to assess the relative risk of different technology path-
ways to reach a particular goal and reduce the probability of being ‘locked in’ to currently attractive
but potentially future-critical technologies. To demonstrate, we apply our method to criticality of the pro-
posed UK electricity system transition, with a focus on neodymium. We anticipate that the supply disrup-
tion potential of neodymium will decrease by almost 30% by 2050; however, our results show the
criticality of low carbon electricity production increases ninefold over this period, as a result of increasing
exposure to neodymium-reliant technologies.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Emissions reductions of the magnitude required to meet the
challenging targets set by international and national bodies [1,2]
will require rapid and systemic change to physical infrastructure,
especially energy systems. This will require a step-change in both
the scale and rate of the roll out of low carbon technologies such as
wind turbines, solar panels and hybrid and electric vehicles. All
these technologies rely on critical materials, such as rare earthelements, in a way that fossil-fuelled energy infrastructure, based
mostly on concrete and steel, does not [3–5]. Currently the Euro-
pean Commission deﬁnes critical materials as those at risk of sup-
ply disruption and which are difﬁcult to substitute [6]. If supply of
these materials is disrupted, there will be a corresponding con-
straint on the rate at which such technologies can be manufactured
and commissioned. This risk is ampliﬁed by the scale of the
requirements of low carbon infrastructure, which is unprece-
dented. The risks of material supply disruption relate not only to
low carbon goals but also to the security of our energy supply; de-
lay or disruption to the roll-out of low carbon technologies could
also endanger energy security by constraining the planned instal-
lation of additional electricity generation capacity, or preventing
1 Which includes an assessment of the ability of the system to respond to a
particular hazard, or its adaptive capacity [15].
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Although it has been recognised that the deployment of low carbon
technologies is susceptible to disruption in the supply of critical
metals [7], the degree of criticality and its potential effect on the
roll-out of new low carbon technologies have only been so far de-
scribed in preliminary and mostly qualitative terms [7,8]. Indeed,
the concept of criticality, while immediately of obvious impor-
tance, is in fact best understood as a combination of different
factors.
Recent studies have attempted to assess the criticality of raw
materials in e.g. speciﬁc geographic regions [3,6,9,10], sectors
[3,8] or companies [10]. The majority of these have developed
assessment methods to identify which raw materials could be con-
sidered critical within the particular scope of the study. Recent
assessments of material criticality have tended to move away from
considering criticality to be solely a function of geological deple-
tion (or resource scarcity), as a result of the large uncertainty asso-
ciated with reserve estimates [6,11]. Instead criticality is usually
described in terms of the potential for supply disruption of a partic-
ular material, and the impact of this disruption on the system of
interest; an approach that is analogous to risk assessment. These
assessments have not yet reached a common deﬁnition of critical-
ity, besides these two dimensions, and the conceptualisation of the
dimensions themselves varies signiﬁcantly between assessments
[12].
Supply disruption is conceived to result from a range of factors
including constraints on expansion of production (such as co-min-
ing), market imbalances or governmental intervention, as well as
geological scarcity [12]. Analysis of supply disruption is predomi-
nantly static, although some have done static assessments of dif-
ferent time periods [3,10]. The majority of studies consider the
concentration of mineral deposits in a small number of countries
to be a potential source of disruption. Shorter term studies have
used sources of imports as a measure of the current distribution
of supply [13], while others have used the distribution of global
production as a measure of the short to mid-term supply basis
[6,8,10]. Some studies weight country shares of production by
political risk [6] or environmental regulation, emphasizing that
some countries have an increased potential for disruption as a re-
sult of these factors. The supply disruption aspect of assessments
often includes additional factors such as substitution or recycling,
to represent the ability to alleviate disruption through reduction
in demand for primary material. This contradicts the analogy to
risk and is one of the principal causes of difference between assess-
ments, since these factors are considered to be a characteristic of
impact in other assessments [12].
In most studies, the conceptualisation of the impact of supply
disruption is tailored to the system of interest and generally repre-
sents the extent to which a system is exposed to the potential for
supply disruption [3,6,10,14]. For example, the European Commis-
sion [6] uses the relative economic contribution of the sector using
the material of interest (in terms of Gross Value Added) to repre-
sent this exposure. Others include the ability of the system to
respond to disruption or its adaptive capacity in the conceptualisa-
tion of impact. For example, Graedel et al. [10] use a combination
of the importance of the material of interest and the ability of
the system to respond to disruption, which is better aligned with
the concept of vulnerability [15]. In a material criticality context,
such responses include substitutability or recycling of materials
to reduce primary demand [16].
While previous approaches have quantiﬁed the criticality of a
material in a particular context at a particular point in time, this
study differs substantially in scope and purpose. It analyzes
whether the disruption in supply of critical materials could impede
low carbon infrastructure transitions. Previous methods of critical-
ity analysis have two principal limitations in this context: thestatic nature of analysis and the individual analysis of separate
parts of a connected system (i.e. a country or a company) rather
than systemic analysis of a goal.
Infrastructure transitions happen over a period of decades and
decisions taken now will affect technology change up to 40 years
hence. It could be expected that both supply disruption potential
and exposure of the system will change signiﬁcantly over this per-
iod, since their contributing technical, socioeconomic and environ-
mental factors all vary over time. Therefore, static analysis of
criticality at the start of transition will not help to identify the fu-
ture constraints to which we could be exposed as a result of deci-
sions taken now. Despite this, no previous studies have conducted
a fully dynamic criticality analysis, although some have done static
assessments of different time periods [3,10], or analysed stock and
ﬂows of materials over time [17,18]. Thus, new approaches are re-
quired to incorporate the dynamic aspect of criticality [19].
Assessing the material criticality of infrastructure transitions
requires systemic analysis of a goal (low carbon transition) which
is deﬁned by the function of the system (provision of low carbon
electricity). The transition towards low carbon electricity could
happen in a range of ways and requires the contribution of econo-
mies, companies and technologies. Current approaches, which sep-
arately analyse the criticality of an economy, company or
technology, underemphasize the systemic nature of criticality.
Therefore, new approaches are required to assess exposure of dif-
ferent pathways towards a particular system goal.
We deﬁne criticality as the combination of the potential for sup-
ply disruption and the exposure of pre-determined pathways (or
scenarios) of technology roll out to that disruption, which is consis-
tent with previous assessments. Furthermore, we assess how both
dimensions of criticality change over time and present a method
which allows us to quantify this deﬁnition for the goal of infra-
structure transition. In this way criticality helps us to assess
whether a disruption in the supply of a particular material could
prevent us from achieving the scale and pace of roll out of technol-
ogies and materials necessary to decarbonise our infrastructure
systems. We do not provide a threshold over which criticality is
deemed to be unacceptable; instead we develop a method which
enables the comparison of the criticality of different pathways.
To this end we normalise our analysis with respect to the values
for some well-characterised element (e.g. iron), which allows us
to express relative criticality.
We start with a description of the assessment methodology in
terms of the metrics, the forecasting of future change in these met-
rics and the combination of individual metrics into indices. The
methodology is demonstrated by applying it to the planned
deployment of a low carbon technology in the UK. We conclude
with a discussion of the application and limitations of this ap-
proach to quantifying the risk to low carbon infrastructure transi-
tions, and thus the energy security of a system that relies heavily
thereon, posed by critical material supply disruption.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Criticality assessment
We conceptualise criticality as analogous to risk, which is a
well-established and familiar process to policy-makers and com-
mercial organisation. This increases the potential of the approach
to engage policy makers and industry [20]. We use risk, as opposed
to the concept of vulnerability,1 to avoid the endogenisation of po-
tential policy responses, such as substitution and recycling. One of
Fig. 1. Indices (P and E) and metrics for assessing the criticality of infrastructure transitions.
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policy responses to reduce criticality; therefore, we exclude mea-
sures such as substitutability and recyclability, which have been
used in other assessments [12].
Analogously to risk, criticality is deﬁned as the product of the
probability of an event and the severity of harm resulting from that
event. We create two principal indices to represent these dimen-
sions of risk:
 Supply disruption potential (P), which quantiﬁes the likelihood
that access to a particular material could be restricted.
 Exposure to disruption (E), which quantiﬁes the effect of disrup-
tion on the goal in question.
When combined through multiplication, the two indices pro-
vide our assessment of the risk, C(t) that material criticality poses
to a low carbon electricity system transition:
CðtÞ ¼ PðtÞ  EðtÞ ð1Þ
Importantly, both indices are produced as a forecasted time-
series, which allows us to estimate criticality over time and iden-
tify trends of increasing (or decreasing) criticality. Each index is
composed of a series of metrics, the trends in which can be tracked
individually. This is essential to provide more detailed insights into
the drivers of criticality for particular materials or technologies and
the associated policy interventions that might reduce criticality.
The combination of metrics contributing to indices is summarised
in Fig. 1 and the metrics themselves are described below.
Using this method it is possible to analyse the criticality of a
range of transition pathways, such as those outlined by DECC in
the Carbon Plan [21], to compare the material risks of different
pathways to the same goal. This is demonstrated in Section 3 of
this article.2.2. Supply disruption potential, P
The supply disruption potential index represents the likelihood
that access to a particular material could be restricted as a result of
an imbalance between production and requirements, which could
be exacerbated by a range of factors that could constrain future in-
creases in production. Therefore we produce a metric ‘r’ which rep-
resents the potential scale and frequency of imbalance over the
period of analysis and a series of exacerbating factors cx. Compre-
hensive analysis of each exacerbating factor would be complex and
require advanced modelling. Therefore, we have selected three fac-
tors that are considered to have signiﬁcant and direct inﬂuence on
production-requirements imbalance, have widely recognised met-
rics associated with them, and are readily quantiﬁable. These three
factors are: co-production (cC) (many of critical materials are not
produced as primary products but as co-products of othermaterials); geographic distribution of production (cH) (geographic
monopolies in production may tempt policymakers to impose sup-
ply restrictions for geopolitical purposes); and environmental con-
straints (cE) (the environmental sensitivity of land surrounding
mines may give rise to restrictive legislation).
For a given material, we assume that the exacerbating factors
tempering the production-requirement imbalance r (namely cC, H,
E) are independent and equally weighted. The sum of the exacer-
bating factors is multiplied by the production-requirements imbal-
ance to provide an overall assessment of the potential for supply
disruption.
In order to compare criticalities of materials we normalise with
respect to the values for some well-characterised element (e.g.
iron), denoted by the subscript 0. This allows us to express relative
criticality: we will be able to analyse the magnitude of the increase
in criticality (e.g. ‘‘moving to the new technology will increase the
risk of probability of disruption by a factor of p/p0’’). Normalising
with respect to a reference material, we can write (Eq. (2)):
pðtÞ
p0
¼ PðtÞ ¼
P
cðtÞP
c0
 r
r0
 
ð2Þ
The production of individual metrics contributing to P is de-
scribed below.
2.2.1. Production-requirements imbalance, r
Historically, production of materials has increased in response
to market signals driven by greater demand. However, a number
of emerging technologies, such as wind turbines, electric vehicle
and solar photovoltaics that rely on materials identiﬁed as poten-
tially critical [3,6,9] are forecast to be rolled out at an unprece-
dented scale and rate, increasing demand for materials such as
neodymium and indium by up to 700% and 800% respectively [6].
Expanding the production of mines can be slow; the lead times in-
volved can be in the order of years or even decades [22]. This limits
the ability of production to respond to the projected increase in
requirements within the timescales required [9]; normal market
signals will not be effective in stimulating new production.
This increase in pressure on production is measured using a ra-
tio of requirements to production over the period under investiga-
tion (2012–2050). The European Commission (EC) study on critical
raw materials uses a version of this ratio with a static level of pro-
duction and only taking into account requirements from new tech-
nologies [6]. This ratio has been adapted in this study to include a
forecast of production and requirements and to include require-
ments from all uses, not just new technologies. A shortfall between
potential production and forecasted requirements implies that
there is potential for disruption of supply.
The metric of imbalance r, depends on the expected level of glo-
bal production M(t) and the expected global requirements R(t) at a
point in time. M(t) is forecast by projecting historical trends in
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nologies as well as future requirements for other uses, which has
often been excluded from previous assessments [23–25]. The spe-
ciﬁc assumptions used for the derivation of M(t) and R(t) for the
case study in this article is presented in Supplementary
information.
We derive two metrics to quantify the severity of a supply
imbalance between M(t) and R(t), and multiply these to provide
at total severity estimate r.
(1) n: Likelihood of supply disruption is the probability that
R(t) > M(t) over the period considered i.e.;
n ¼ aR>M
a
ð3Þ
where aR>M is the number of years in which R > M and a is the
total number of years of the period under investigation (2012–
2050). n therefore varies between 0 (requirements exceeds produc-
tion in none of the years) to 1 (requirements exceeds production in
all of the years).
(2) r Scale of potential supply disruption is the average of
(R M)/(R + M) over the time period of analysis, counting
only years where there is a deﬁcit (i.e. where R > M) and thus
effectively assuming a worst case scenario where surpluses
cannot be carried forward; r therefore varies between 0
(production exceeds requirements in all years) to 1 (produc-
tion is insigniﬁcant compared to requirements in all years).
In notation form: for a years;
where Mt > Rt then rt ¼ 0; ð4Þ
and;where Mt < Rt; then rt ¼ Rt MtRt þMt ð5Þ
The severity of disruption is the product of the frequency and
scale, therefore; we can write:
r ¼ nr ¼ aR>M
a

P
rt
a
ð6Þ
The metric r gives a general indication of the potential scale and
frequency of market imbalances over the period.
2.2.2. Companion fraction (cC)
A large proportion of materials currently considered critical are
not mined in their own right, but rather as a co-product of a pri-
mary material, usually a ‘major’ metal with very high demand
across a range of economic sectors, such as copper or zinc [26]. If
a critical metal constitutes only a small proportion (in terms of
tonnage and/or price) of the output of a mine, it is unlikely that
production would increase solely as a result of a rise in demand
for this material, since this would result in a surplus (and thus
price suppression) of the primary metal, potentially making the
mine less economic overall. This effect is particularly signiﬁcant
where the critical metal price is low and the reduced price for
the primary metal cannot be compensated for by the increase in
production of the critical metal co-product.
To reﬂect this constraint we have included a metric cC which
captures the product-co-product balance. In common with other
assessments we include a measure of the proportion of critical
material by mass in the output of mines where it is produced.
However, we enhance this approach by incorporating the percent-
age contribution of the material to the price of one unit of mine
output; the economic value of output. Thus:
cC ¼ 1
Cm þ Cp
2
 
ð7Þwhere Cm is the contribution of critical material to the mass of mine
output and Cp is the contribution to the economic value of mine out-
put. We weight the contribution from mass and price equally in the
absence of evidence that they are not equally important. The in-
verse is taken to ensure the scale represents the same as other exac-
erbating factors i.e. 0 is low and 1 is high. Thus, a value of cC
approaching 0 would indicate that the material is mined in its
own right; a value approaching 1 would indicate that it is almost
entirely mined as a co-product of another material.
We calculate the proportion of material considered by mass in
the output of mines at which it is produced (the mass fraction Cm):
Cm ¼ mimx ð8Þ
where mi is the mass of material i produced at mine x and mx is the
total mass of material produced at mine x (data from [27]). In the
event of insufﬁcient data on mine outputs, the typical mass fraction
of the most commonly produced ore grade is used.
To account for the effect of the price of the material considered
to increase the likelihood of accelerating production we calculate
the percentage contribution of the material to the price of one unit
of mine output (the price fraction Cp):
Cp ¼ pi mip ð9Þ
where pi is price per unit of material (using 2010 ﬁgures taken from
USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries [28]) and p is total monetary
output of the mine.
It is possible that the companion fraction of critical materials
will change over time; however, there is insufﬁcient data to fore-
cast how this might develop. Therefore it is assumed that the com-
panion fraction stays the same over the period of analysis.
2.2.3. Access (cH)
Mineral deposits, by virtue of the processes by which they are
formed, tend to be concentrated in a speciﬁc geographic location,
which has implications for access to these materials in countries
that do not have their own deposits. This geographic concentra-
tion of materials does not directly constrain the acceleration of
production; however, the monopoly created by this concentra-
tion of production can restrict access to produced materials, fur-
ther distorting the balance between requirements (outside the
country of production) and available production. There is poten-
tial for producing countries to pursue industrial and/or geopolit-
ical strategies to reserve resources for their exclusive use though
trade restrictions, taxations and investment policies. An example
of this is the tightening restrictions that China has placed on
Rare Earth metal exports [29–31]. The geographic concentration
of production at present is not necessarily indicative of concen-
tration in the future. For example, China currently produces over
97% of rare earth elements; however, it only holds 36% of re-
ported reserves [28]. This would imply that geopolitics could
potentially become a less signiﬁcant factor in the potential for
supply disruption and that a dynamic measure of access is
essential.
The Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used in previous crit-
icality assessment to quantify the level of concentration of world-
wide production [6,10]. In this assessment we also use HHI but
create a forecast to 2050 to support dynamic analysis. HHI is calcu-
lated by squaring the share of production from each country for a
given year and summing the result for all producing countries (Eq.
(10)):
cHðtÞ ¼ HHIðtÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
H2it ð10Þ
382 K. Roelich et al. / Applied Energy 123 (2014) 378–386where Hit is the share of production of country i in year t and n is the
number of producing countries.
The HHI falls onto a 0–1 scale where HHI approaching 1 would
represent a concentration of supply in a single country approach-
ing a monopoly and HHI approaching 0 would suggest very distrib-
uted supply and a competitive supply chain. A low level of
competition (or a high cH) would increase the supply disruption
potential as a result of its magniﬁcation of the risk associated with
the production-requirements imbalance.
We forecast the distribution of production of each critical mate-
rial and estimate how cH might change over time. The forecast is
produced by interpolating between the distribution of current pro-
duction and the distribution of reserves. This assumes that produc-
tion distribution at the end of the period (2050) is the same as the
estimated reserve distribution in 2012. This is a simpliﬁcation of
the real situation but is used to indicate how cH might evolve over
time based on current reserves and market responses.2 Within the country or region of interest – note that this may differ from the global
roll out of low carbon technologies used to determine future global requirements
within the production-requirements imbalance metric is the scale of decarbonisation
is sub-global.2.2.4. Environmental constraints (cE)
The production of metals can have signiﬁcant environmental
impacts as a result of pollutant discharge to air, land and water
and waste production [32] and consumption of energy and water,
which will increase as ore grades deteriorate [33]. In an attempt to
contain these impacts, and as a result of international treaties,
environmental regulation is becoming increasingly stringent. This
is presenting a barrier to the expansion of existing mining opera-
tions or the development of mines by increasing the cost of
production.
Quantifying the extent of environmental constraints on mining
or the direct effect of regulation on new mining operations is
rather difﬁcult. As an alternative, previous assessments have used
the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), as a measure of ‘‘the
risk that measures might be taken by countries with the intention of
protecting the environment and by doing so endangering the supply
of raw materials. . .’’ [6]. The EPI and its constituent indicators are
described in more detail in the Supplementary Information, S3.
Although several of the indicators used for the EPI are directly rel-
evant to mining operations, e.g. Change in Water Quantity and For-
rest Loss, we do not include it as a direct indicator for
environmental regulations that impact mining operations. Rather,
it provides a country level comparison of the potential for a coun-
try to already have, or institute new environmental regulations
that may constrain mining operations [34]. The majority of critical
metals are mined in more than one country, therefore, it is neces-
sary to combine the EPI of individual countries to determine what
the European Commission terms the Environmental Country Risk
(ECR) [6], here termed cE.
To calculate cE for a given year, we divide the EPI for each pro-
ducing country by 100 to convert to a 0–1 scale, weight the score
by the share of production from each country and sum the result-
ing ﬁgures.:
cEðtÞ ¼ ECRðtÞ ¼
X EPIi
100
 
 Mit
Mx
 
ð11Þ
where EPIi is the environmental performance index of country i, Mit
is the production of a speciﬁc material in country i in year t and Mx
is total production of that material. A value of cE approaching 0 indi-
cates that there is unlikely to be any constraints to the development
of new mining operations from environmental regulation.
It is likely that the environmental performance of countries
(and hence the EPI) will improve over time, however there is insuf-
ﬁcient historical data on which to base any forecasts about the rate
of this improvement and this could be balanced (or even out-
weighed) by the fact that environmental legislation is likely to be-
come more restrictive. Therefore, the EPI for each country is heldstatic over the period of analysis, using the latest available values
from the 2012 report [34]. However, the proportions of production
in different countries (and therefore the contribution of each EPI to
cE) are likely to change. The forecast split of global production be-
tween countries is obtained from the HHI forecasts described
above.
2.3. Exposure to supply disruption, E
This index represents the effect of supply disruption on the
transition to a low carbon infrastructure system. In an overall elec-
tricity system in transition towards a low-carbon paradigm, any
disruption to the roll-out of the technology on which this transi-
tion depends has obvious implications for energy security. Unlike
the supply disruption potential, which is a material property, expo-
sure is a property of the technical system and, therefore, must be
assessed at the level of the goal we are analysing i.e. decarbonisa-
tion of the infrastructure system. Exposure is operationalized as
the product of the proportion of the goal affected by any disruption
(the goal sensitivity SG), and the likely effect of increasing price
resulting from disruption (the price sensitivity SP);
EðtÞ ¼ SGðtÞ  SP ð12Þ
The two metrics contributing to our exposure indicator are de-
scribed in detail below.
2.3.1. Goal sensitivity SG
The overall goal of transition to a low carbon infrastructure sys-
tem is operationalized as pathway or scenarios of technology roll
out required to achieve decarbonisation.2 The goal sensitivity, or
the impact of a supply disruption on the overall goal, is measured
in this index as the proportion of the decarbonisation pathway that
relies on the technology or technologies affected by the potential
material supply disruption. This assessment is based on the contri-
bution of the technology of interest to the low carbon goal (MW of
electricity generation capacity, or tonnes of CO2 reduction) as de-
ﬁned in the relevant pre-deﬁned pathway (in this analysis this is ta-
ken to be the Department for Energy and Climate Change’s (DECC)
low carbon pathways [21]);
SG ¼ GtechGgoal ð13Þ
where SG is goal sensitivity; Gtech is the amount contributed to the
low carbon goal (miles, MW, CO2 reduction etc.) by the technology
(deﬁned in relevant scenario); and Ggoal is the total amount required
to achieve goal (deﬁned in relevant pathway).
A high value of SG (i.e. approaching unity) would imply that con-
straining the roll out of the technology of interest could completely
derail the goal of low carbon infrastructure. A low value of SG (i.e.
approaching zero) would mean that the goal was relatively insen-
sitive to the roll out of the technology of interest.
SG is produced as a time series because the contribution of a
particular technology in any year varies according to the pathway.
2.3.2. Price sensitivity SP
As well as having the potential to physically constrain technol-
ogy roll out, supply disruption could cause an increase in price,
which could have further implications. To capture this effect, the
price sensitivity metric quantiﬁes the proportion of the total tech-
nology cost contributed by the cost of the material at risk of supply
disruption;
250,000 
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where SP is price sensitivity; Vmat is the price of material in technol-
ogy of interest (i.e. price per tonne multiplied by mass of material in
technology); and Vtech is the price of technology of interest.
A high value of SP (i.e. approaching unity) would imply that the
technology cost was very sensitive to ﬂuctuations in material price.
A low value of SP (i.e. approaching zero) would imply that the tech-
nology cost was relatively insensitive to price ﬂuctuations and
material supply disruption was less likely to constrain the required
technology roll out as a result of increasing prices. It is recognised
that the scale and design of technologies will change over time,
affecting the price sensitivity. However, this change cannot be
quantiﬁed to any degree of certainty at this time; therefore, this
metric is assumed to be static for now.
3. Results
The criticality assessment method is demonstrated using a case
study of neodymium criticality to UK low carbon electricity, with a
focus on wind turbines. Rare earth elements, predominantly neo-
dymium, are used in permanent magnets required for gearless, di-
rect drive wind turbines. Wind power has the potential to
contribute signiﬁcantly to the decarbonization of UK electricity
generation and is central to many of DECC’s 2050 Pathways [21].
An ambitious roll-out programme of wind turbines is required to
replace fossil-fuel powered generation, with aforementioned
implications for energy security. Neodymium is already identiﬁed
by many recent reports as being at risk of supply disruption as a
result of the concentration of its production in China [3,6,8,18].
We use this case study to determine how this potential supply dis-
ruption might affect the deployment of low carbon electricity gen-
eration in the UK. We recognise that this is only a ﬁrst
approximation as we need to take into account the fact that almost
all signiﬁcant technologies are exposed to criticality via multiple
materials and that individual critical elements are essential to
the operation of multiple technologies.
3.1. Criticality of low carbon electricity
The criticality of two of DECC’s 2050 Pathways; Core Pathway
and its Renewable Pathway [21]; have been calculated for the per-
iod from 2012 to 2050. The data used in support of these calcula-
tions are presented in Supplementary information. The results
(presented in Fig. 2) show that criticality in the Core Pathway in-
creases more than threefold over the period from 2012 to 2050,
with a step-change occurring in 2030, as shown with reference
to 2012 values. This trend is even more dramatic in the Renewables
scenario with a ninefold increase.Fig. 2. Criticality of two scenarios of transition to low carbon electricity generation
in the UK 2012–2050.The results of the composite index show a signiﬁcant increase
but provide little insight into how policy makers or commercial
organisations might intervene to reduce this criticality. This re-
quires analysis of the metrics contributing to the composite index,
which is discussed in the following sections.
4.2. Neodymium supply disruption potential
Despite the signiﬁcant increase in criticality, the supply disrup-
tion potential (P) of neodymium (normalised to iron) decreases
over the period of analysis from 10.86 to 7.90, a 27% reduction. This
indicates that the overall trend in criticality of UK electricity sys-
tem decarbonization is driven strongly by the UK’s increasing
exposure to supply disruption and that intervention would be most
effective if focused on reducing this exposure. This is not to say
that intervention should not aim to accelerate the reduction in
supply disruption potential, therefore we discuss the metrics
which constitute this index in more detail below.
3.2.1. Neodymium production-requirements imbalance (r)
When we forecast neodymium production and requirements
(using data presented in Supplementary information) we ﬁnd that
there is an acceleration in projected requirements in 2030 as a re-
sult of global demand for low carbon technologies. Production is
forecast by projecting the historical exponential growth pattern
of neodymium mining; however even exponential growth in pro-
duction cannot keep up with expansion in the number of technol-
ogies using neodymium and the scale of roll out of these
technologies (see Fig. 3). Consequently both the frequency (i.e.
0.92 indicating that requirements are higher than production for
almost all of the period) and scale of potential disruption (i.e.
0.36 indicating that requirements are signiﬁcantly higher than
requirements) are high. This results in a production-requirements
imbalance (r) over the period 2012–2050 of 0.33 compared to
0.0007 for iron, indicating that there is a high potential for supply
disruption.
3.2.2. Exacerbating factors (c)
Neodymium is mined as a co-product of other rare earth metals
and represents only 15% of rare earth mine output (Cm = 0.15). It
also has a relatively low contribution to the economic value of
mine output (16%; CP = 0.16)) so could be expected to have limited
inﬂuence over total mine production when compared to other rare
earth elements. This results in a high score for cC (0.85), which
indicates that co-mining has a high potential to exacerbate the pro-
duction-requirements imbalance (Fig. 4).-
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with the majority produced in China; therefore cH is almost unity
in 2012 (0.92). However, neodymium reserves are less geographi-
cally concentrated than current production would suggest [28].
When production distribution is forecast towards reserve distribu-
tion cH reduces to 0.28 by 2050 (Fig. 4). This reﬂects the likely fu-
ture evolution of a far more competitive supply chain, which could
mitigate the high disruption potential, such as the reopening of
historic mines outside of China [35].
The risk that environmental legislation could constrain the
development of new reserves of neodymium, is relatively low in
2012 (0.42) as a result of the dominance of China (which has a
low EPI) in its production. However, as we increase the distribution
of production, the contribution of countries with a higher level of
environmental legislation, such as Australia and the USA, increases
and cE increases slightly by 2050 to reﬂect this increase in con-
straint from regulation (to 0.47) (Fig. 4).3.3. Exposure of wind power to neodymium supply disruption
The evolution of exposure of low carbon electricity generation
to neodymium supply disruption from 2012 to 2050, is shown in
Fig. 5. The trend is the opposite to that of the supply disruption po-
tential, with exposure increasing signiﬁcantly over the period un-
der investigation, as direct drive wind turbines become more
prevalent in the wind power sector. The peaks and troughs in the
exposure trend are artefacts of the uneven roll out of wind turbines
in the DECC pathways.
The ‘goal’ of low carbon electricity generation, which is exposed
to supply disruption, is taken to be the capacity of low carbon elec-
tricity generation required each year. This has been derived for0
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Fig. 5. Exposure of two scenarios of transition to low carbon electricity generation
to neodymium supply disruption 2012–2050.both DECC’s Core Pathway and its Renewable Pathway [21] for
the period from 2012 to 2050. The capacity of low carbon electric-
ity provided each year by technologies containing neodymium is
calculated using the split of on-shore and offshore turbines (from
DECC’s Pathways [21]) and estimates for the proportion of turbines
which will be direct drive (taken from [3,36]).
The goal sensitivity SG increases dramatically over the period
under investigation from 0.02 to 0.08 for the Core Scenario and
from 0.02 to 0.26 for the Renewables Scenario (i.e. up to 26% of
low carbon electricity generation is provided by wind turbines
with permanent magnets).
The price sensitivity of the goal SP is static and was estimated
using a 3 MW direct-drive wind turbine, which is representative
of the type of turbine that would be deployed in the initial period
of the study [37].
4. Discussion
The results of the case study demonstrate the importance of
considering the dynamic analysis of the risk of material criticality.
In the case of low carbon electricity from wind turbines in the UK,
the likely decrease in P for the key critical material is outweighed
by the increase in the exposure E of the goal to that material as the
electricity system becomes increasingly reliant on wind turbines;
thus the overall criticality C increases over the analysis period.
The dynamic approach described in this article allows analysis of
the nature of the change in criticality over time. The results
showed a steep increase in criticality after 2030, when roll out of
direct drive turbines is projected to increase dramatically. It will
be more difﬁcult to devise industrial policy responses to such steep
changes than to static high levels of criticality.
The systemic nature and goal orientation of this approach al-
lows us to analyse the relative risk to different pathways to achieve
the goal of low carbon transition (demonstrated using DECC’s Core
and Renewables pathways). This provides more speciﬁc and rele-
vant information to support decision making under uncertainty
and may prevent reliance on pathways and technologies that could
become highly critical in the future (creating ‘lock-in’). The UK
aims to replace a signiﬁcant proportion of current generating
capacity with wind turbines, in pursuit of low-carbon goals. There-
fore; this analysis could also improve decision making in support
of energy security to avoid supply shortfall as a result of restricted
roll-out of technology on the scale planned.
A further advantage of the method is its inclusion of demand for
critical material from sectors and countries outside the scope of the
analysis; to represent the competition with these sectors and
countries for material access. The majority of studies of material
criticality and low carbon technologies consider only demand for
K. Roelich et al. / Applied Energy 123 (2014) 378–386 385material from these technologies [8,24,38,39], (with the exception
of Alonso et al. [40]), which excludes a signiﬁcant source of de-
mand. We include demand from these sources in our forecast of
global requirements, which affects the production-requirements
imbalance and; therefore, the supply disruption potential.
The case study used to demonstrate the methodology was cho-
sen for its relative simplicity but it is possible to extend this appli-
cation to analysis of multiple materials and technologies or to
other societal goals. A further extension could be to undertake
additional analysis to explore the effect of substitution (of materi-
als or technologies) or recycling on criticality through exogenous
scenarios. This would support analysis of the effectiveness of dif-
ferent interventions to help shape policy approaches to reduce
the criticality of particular goals.
We recognise that the use of composite indicator has limita-
tions, particularly in relation to indicator aggregation and combi-
nation [6]. A correlation analysis has been undertaken to
examine the independence of indicators and the associated
assumptions made when combining metrics (results presented in
Supplementary Information). A number of the metrics are shown
as having no correlation or total correlation because those metrics
are static (r, cC and SP). However, analysis shows a high degree
of correlation between some of the metrics used to construct the
supply disruption potential index. There is a very high degree of
correlation between cH and cE because cE uses the same produc-
tion distribution data as cH, to weight the EPI to produce ECR.
When cE is forecast, the EPI remains static so the trend is entirely
driven by production distribution, which explains the high degree
of correlation. This means that the metrics are not entirely
independent, which is implied by the additive combination of
indicators.
Some metrics which might contribute to our understanding of
criticality have been excluded because robust data is not widely
available or they are not widely supported as reliable indicators
by criticality investigators. For example, some studies have in-
cluded measures of the stability of government and the potential
for instability to constrain production. The Worldwide Governance
Indicator (WGI) of ‘political stability and absence of violence’ has
been used in some studies as a proxy for this [6,10]. However,
the WGIs are highly criticized [41,42] and there is no reported cor-
relation between political instability and production; therefore, we
do not include this measure in our analysis.
The assessment of supply disruption potential only considers
disruption at the point of production. We also recognise that the
supply chain of critical materials has additional down-stream
stages where disruption may occur. This has been explored quali-
tatively [7] but a quantitative analysis will require signiﬁcant fur-
ther data gathering, investigation and analysis.
We have forecast a number of the indicators in order to demon-
strate the beneﬁts of a more dynamic analysis of criticality. It has
been necessary to make a series of assumptions to support this
forecasting that are of course contestable. The methods used to
forecast production and requirements rely on the continuation of
historic trends to forecast future change. Future production and
requirements will in fact be driven and constrained by a multitude
of interrelated physical and economic factors, many of which can-
not be predicted (e.g. disruptive new technologies, changes in pat-
terns of consumption) [23,25]. A deeper understanding of these
relationships and their consequences would require more detailed
analysis of agent interactions and decisions [19]. Nonetheless, we
consider our forecasts to be appropriate for their intended purpose
of providing an indication of the potential for an imbalance be-
tween production and requirements in the future.
In common with Graedel et al. [10,43] we have not included any
discussion of a threshold of criticality, because our indicators areintended to be used to compare the relative criticality of different
pathways to low carbon infrastructure, rather than deﬁning the
point at which criticality becomes unacceptable. This is not to
say that it is not possible to deﬁne a threshold of this nature rather
that it is not the intention of this article; criticality thresholds will
need to be informed by a combination of political and economic
factors as well as a technical analysis of criticality.5. Conclusions
In this article we present an assessment method to analyse
whether disruption in the supply chain of a critical material could
impede strategic infrastructure transitions and thus compromise
energy security. We have developed a new approach to enable
the dynamic analysis of the risk that disruption in the supply of
materials could affect the scale and speed of the roll out of low car-
bon technologies necessary to achieve the goal of low carbon infra-
structure transition. This has required some signiﬁcant
developments from existing methodologies to enable us to: assess
the change in constraints during an infrastructure transition; and
systemically assess the effects of disruption on a particular goal,
rather than individual analysis of separte parts of a connected sys-
tem. The method we present in this paper does not provide an
absolute risk, but a relative risk. However, this still allows us to
conﬁdently compare different technology options or roll-out sce-
narios vis a vis which is likely to be the most heavily exposed to
disruption in supply of critical materials.
The importance of dynamic analysis is exempliﬁed in our case
study of the criticality of neodymium for low carbon electricity
generation. In this case a slight reduction in the supply disruption
potential of neodymium over the period of analysis is outweighed
by a signiﬁcant increase in the exposure of the goal of low carbon
electricity to this supply disruption as a result of an increasing reli-
ance on direct drive wind turbines. It is not just the overall trend
that is of concern in this case study, but the steep increases in crit-
icality over short periods of time. These step changes in criticality
are more challenging for industry and policy makers to respond to
than static, high levels of criticality. This shows the value of a more
dynamic, infrastructure-focused analysis of criticality, which can
potentially be useful in providing policy makers with information
to reduce the probability of ‘locking-in’ to currently attractive
but potentially future-critical technologies.AbbreviationsC Criticality
DECC Department for Energy and Climate Change
E Exposure
EC European Commission
ECR Environmental Country Risk
EPI Environmental Performance Index
cC Companion fraction
cE Environmental constraints
cH Access
HHI Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index
MW megawatts
P Supply disruption potential
r Production-requirements imbalance
SG Goal sensitivity
SP Price sensitivity
UK United Kingdom
Vmat Value of critical material in technology
Vtech Total value of technology
WGI World Governance Indicator
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